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FAMILY LAW: DIVORCE: CONTRACT LAW 
Summary 
 The Supreme Court of Nevada held that the doctrine of mutual mistake is not grounds for 
rescission of a contract when the party bears the risk of mistake. The party bears the risk of 
mistake if the party is aware at the time of the formation of the contract that they only have 
limited knowledge of the facts to which the mistake relates, but treats that knowledge as 
sufficient, the court will allocate the risk of mistake to that party.  
Background 
 In 2012, Mark Anderson (Mark) filed for divorce from Sophia Sanchez (Sophia). The 
parties reached a settlement agreement in regard to their property distribution; including a home 
located on East Wilson Avenue in Orange, CA (Wilson property). The agreement stated the 
Wilson property was owned by the parties’ trust and agreed that the property would be awarded 
to Mark in exchange for Mark paying Sophia $75,000, or half of the property’s net value, from 
his retirement account. Mark and Sophia signed a written Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) to memorialize their agreement, acknowledging that they understood and would be 
contractually bound by its terms.  
 Mark subsequently filed a notice stating his intent to withdraw and revoke his signature 
from the MOU, while Sophia moved to enforce it. Mark moved to set aside the MOU as 
unenforceable, citing NRCP 60(b).
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 Even though Mark acknowledged that he and Sophia held 
title, Mark alleged that they had a prior oral agreement with his sister Cheryl Parr, under which 
Cheryl transferred title to them in order to obtain loans for the residence’s renovation. Mark 
further argued that after these loans were paid off, he and Sophia were to transfer title back to 
Cheryl. 
Discussion 
 Before the Supreme Court, Mark argues that the MOU should be set aside based upon the 
parties’ mutual mistake. He argues that the Wilson property was not community property and 
that both parties mistakenly believed at the time of negotiations that their title to the Wilson 
property supplanted Cheryl’s ownership interest.  
Settlement agreements are contracts and therefore are governed by principles of contract 
law.
3
 A mutual mistake may be grounds to render a contract void, or to equitably rescind the 
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  Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) states in part: “On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: 
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence 
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  Grisham v. Grisham, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 60, 289 P.3d 230, 234 (2012). 
contract. The Court defines mutual mistake as when “both parties, at the time of contracting, 
share a misconception about a vital fact upon which they based their bargain.”4 
In this case, the Court held that there was no mutual mistake because both parties were 
aware of Cheryl’s interest in the property when they entered into the agreement. Mark had 
represented in his motion that the parties had always known that the Wilson property belonged to 
Cheryl, and attached offers of proof to support that decision. Because of this, the parties’ had no 
shared misconception of a vital fact concerning the Wilson property.  
 Even if the Court were to assume that both parties were unaware or misinformed of the 
legal effect of Cheryl’s purported interest had on their disposition of the Wilson property, mutual 
mistake is not grounds for rescission when the party bears the risk of mistake.
5
 Here, Mark bore 
the risk of mistake even if he did not have sufficient knowledge of the legal consequences of his 
settlement agreement because he knew that the Wilson property may have been subject to an 
equitable trust, and thus, might not be appropriate for distribution under the MOU.  
Conclusion 
 The Court affirmed the divorce decree concluding that there was substantial evidence to 
support the district court’s decision to enforce the MOU.  
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